For a full explanation of directors’ offences in Singapore and the elements required to prove them, see our pages on directors’ offences and their punishment, the elements of a director’s breach of duty and the elements of a director’s insolvency offences.

How do the courts decide the sentence?

The offences are found in the Companies Act 1967 (“CA”) and the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (“IRDA”). We refer to them as directors’ offences because directors are the people most often charged with them, although several are not limited to directors. Different approaches apply to the two offences most often prosecuted:

  • Fraudulent trading (section 238(4) of the IRDA): the courts compare the case with earlier decisions (see below).
  • Nominee directors failing to use reasonable diligence (section 157(1) of the CA): the framework in Public Prosecutor v Zheng Jia [2025] 3 SLR 1290 (see below).

Fraudulent trading: comparison with earlier cases

The courts compare the case before them with earlier decisions, having regard in particular to:

  • the number of victims implicated;
  • the sums involved;
  • the sophistication of the scheme;
  • how long it lasted;
  • the actual losses suffered, as opposed to the sums that passed through the scheme; and
  • the personal gain received by the offender.

The vulnerability of the victims, and persistence after warnings from the authorities, have also been treated as aggravating. The decided cases are described below.

Nominee directors: the Zheng Jia framework

In Zheng Jia, the High Court set a sentencing framework for the offence of a director failing to use reasonable diligence under section 157(1) of the CA. The setting was that of nominee directors whose companies’ bank accounts were used to receive the proceeds of crime. The framework also applies to those who abet (i.e., instigate, conspire in or intentionally aid) such a failure. For the wider risks faced by nominee directors, see our page on the risks of being a nominee director.

The framework is undertaken in three steps:

  • Step 1: the court identifies which offence-specific factors are present.
  • Step 2: it places the offence in a band according to the number and gravity of those factors.
  • Step 3: it adjusts the sentence for factors personal to the offender.

Offence-specific factors include:

  • the due diligence done on the company’s activities and on the client;
  • efforts to monitor the bank accounts;
  • how far the director knew or should have known that the failure could enable the company to be misused;
  • how long the conduct lasted;
  • whether it was part of a profit-driven business;
  • any concealment;
  • any cross-border element; and
  • the harm caused. The court declined to give harm the same weight as culpability (i.e., blameworthiness), because harm is ordinarily beyond the director’s control.

The bands are:

BandOffence-specific factors presentSentencing range
Band 1One to threeUp to 4 months’ imprisonment
Band 2Four or five5 to 8 months’ imprisonment
Band 3More than six9 to 12 months’ imprisonment

Imprisonment is presumptive: it is for the director to show why a custodial sentence should not be imposed.

Factors personal to the offender fall on both sides, either aggravating (i.e., increasing the sentence) or mitigating (i.e., reducing the sentence):

  • aggravating: charges taken into consideration (i.e., further charges which the offender admits and agrees may be taken into account in sentencing, instead of being tried separately) and relevant previous convictions; and
  • mitigating: a plea of guilty, genuine remorse, voluntary restitution (i.e., paying back the money) and voluntary co-operation with the authorities.

How the framework was applied in Zheng Jia itself

The offender was a chartered accountant who incorporated companies for foreign clients and acted as their locally resident director. As demand grew, he recruited a second person to do the same, and the second charge was for abetting that person’s failure to use reasonable diligence. Company bank accounts were used to receive the proceeds of scams on foreign companies: US$64,630 in one case and more than US$2.1 million in another.

The District Judge, applying the earlier approach, imposed fines of $3,500 and $5,000. On the Prosecution’s appeal, the High Court placed the two charges in Band 2 (with an indicative sentence of five months) and Band 3 (at least 10 months). It then gave credit for the pleas of guilty, weighed against a charge taken into consideration, and moderated the sentences because they were to run consecutively (one after another). It imposed three months’ and seven months’ imprisonment.

How have the courts applied these approaches since?

The table below summarises how the courts have applied these approaches in some of the decided cases, and the provision under which each offender was charged.

Type of caseWhat happenedThe takeaway
A nominee director who moved the money
Failing to use reasonable diligence (CA s 157(1))
In Public Prosecutor v Liew Sze Hui [2025] SGMC 60, a music trainer agreed, at the request of her then partner (now husband), to act as nominee director of a company set up by his corporate services firm for an overseas client. She opened the company’s bank accounts, handed the banking token to the overseas director and never checked the transactions. The account received more than US$6 million from an overseas fraud victim.
After investigators contacted her husband about another company, she arranged a cashier’s order for the remaining $7.1 million to be sent to China. Seizures recovered most of the money, but US$619,048.48 was lost. She pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment and disqualified for five years.
The court held that the case called for imprisonment under the Zheng Jia framework. Three points were raised in mitigation: the short duration of the directorship, the absence of personal benefit, and the fact that the nominee business was her husband’s. However, these factors did not outweigh her complete abandonment of the duty, and her active part in moving the money after investigations began.
A sham forex investment scheme
Fraudulent trading (CA s 340, now IRDA s 238)
In Ng Kuan Chuan v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 5, the founder of a foreign exchange investment scheme and a director of the brokerage it used had told investors that professional traders would trade for them. In reality, the two of them keyed in the trades, the brokerages traded against the investors, and withdrawals were paid from later investors’ money. The scheme attracted 4,264 investors and about US$21 million, and investors lost about US$13.7 million.
Each had been sentenced to six and a half years’ imprisonment for fraudulent trading. The High Court compared the case with a 2012 High Court decision (Phang Wah v Public Prosecutor [2012] 1 SLR 646) on a much larger scheme (about $175 million), whose operator had received four and a half years, and with later cases, including a 2023 High Court decision (How Soo Feng v Public Prosecutor [2023] SGHC 252) in which 3 years and 10 months was imposed for a scheme with revenue of about $121 million and losses of about $12.9 million. It reduced the sentences to four and a half years for the founder and four years for the brokerage director. Their aggregate sentences, taking into account their other charges, became eight and a half years and five years respectively.
The sentence must sit sensibly with the earlier cases. Six and a half years was manifestly excessive when compared with the four and a half years imposed for a much larger scheme. The six-month difference between the two offenders reflected the brokerage director’s smaller personal gain.
A fake jobs scheme
Fraudulent trading (CA s 340, three charges)
In Lim Jun Yao Clarence v Public Prosecutor [2023] 3 SLR 862 (“Clarence Lim”), the offender and another person used three employment agencies over more than a year to collect about $831,049 from some 1,317 foreign jobseekers for jobs that in actual fact did not exist. After the Ministry of Manpower told one company to stop collecting upfront fees, they devised a second version of the scheme: a second company presented itself as an online job portal and charged the jobseekers fees, and a third company then invited them to interviews that were a facade, offering them jobs only if they first paid fees for compulsory “training”.
After a trial, he was sentenced to 32, 33 and 34 months’ imprisonment on the three charges, and the High Court upheld those sentences. The 32-month and 34-month sentences ran consecutively (one after another) and the 33-month sentence ran concurrently (at the same time), giving 66 months in total. The High Court also upheld a compensation order of $174,385 in favour of the victims.
The number and vulnerability of the victims, premeditation, and carrying on after a warning from the authorities weigh heavily. The profile of the victims matters: the court described the fraud as particularly egregious because the offenders had exploited the anxiety of foreign jobseekers trying to secure employment in Singapore.
A copy-trading scheme with cheating charges
Fraudulent trading (CA s 340)
In a 2025 District Court decision (Public Prosecutor v Ng Swee Khiang [2025] SGDC 207), the offender was convicted after trial for his part in a copy-trading investment scheme run as a Ponzi scheme. The fraudulent trading charge attracted 24 months’ imprisonment, but with 19 charges of conspiring to cheat investors and a charge of falsifying accounts, the total sentence was 80 months.The total depends heavily on which other charges are proceeded with, and on which sentences run consecutively.

Can the sentence be a fine?

Whether a fine alone is appropriate depends on the facts of each case. The courts have recognised that it may be appropriate in some cases, for example:

  • Nominee directors. As explained above, imprisonment is now presumptive, although the director may show why a custodial sentence should not be imposed. The fines imposed under the earlier approach are no longer a guide.
  • Fraudulent trading. A fine of $15,000, with a compensation order of $150,000, was imposed in a 1999 High Court case (Tan Hung Yeoh v Public Prosecutor [1999] 2 SLR(R) 262). In Clarence Lim, however, the High Court declined to rely on that case because no reasons had been given for the sentence.

In other cases, the courts have imposed imprisonment. In Zheng Jia itself, fines of $3,500 and $5,000 were replaced on appeal by three and seven months’ imprisonment. In Liew Sze Hui, a defence submission for the then maximum fine of $5,000 was rejected. For offences committed on or after 6 May 2026, the maximum fine under section 157 of the CA is $20,000.

Fines have been imposed in addition to imprisonment, to strip the offender of his or her gains. In Ng Kuan Chuan, fines of $150,000 on each of two charges under the Securities and Futures Act 2001 stripped the brokerage director of the US$300,000 he had received.

Some statutes require the court, on conviction, to order the offender to pay a penalty in addition to any other punishment, to strip him or her of the benefit received from the offence. Examples are the Multi-Level Marketing and Pyramid Selling (Prohibition) Act 1973 (the “MLM Act”), for promoting or participating in a pyramid selling scheme (section 7), and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1960, for accepting a bribe (section 13; see our page on the penalty for receiving a bribe). The directors’ offences carry no penalty of this kind of their own, so a penalty arises only where a charge under such a statute is also proceeded with. In the same appeal, the founder was also convicted of promoting a pyramid selling scheme under the MLM Act, and was ordered to pay a penalty of $3,658,600, with 18 months’ imprisonment if it was not paid. A penalty differs from a fine. A fine is a punishment for the offence, fixed by the court within the statutory maximum. A penalty under the MLM Act is aimed at stripping the offender of his or her financial gain, and is measured by the benefit derived: in the same appeal, it was calculated from the US$2.7 million that the founder had siphoned off, less his proven expenses.

Can the court order compensation for victims?

Yes. On conviction, the court may order the offender to pay compensation to the victims (section 359 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010). A compensation order is not part of the sentence. Its purpose is to allow a victim to recover compensation where a civil claim would be an inadequate or impractical remedy. This is particularly relevant where the victims cannot practically bring their own claims. In Clarence Lim, the victims were foreign jobseekers who had each paid between $290 and $1,030. The High Court upheld a compensation order of $174,385, observing that it would be unrealistic and impracticable for them to seek redress through a civil suit in Singapore.

That sum was not the whole amount taken (about $831,049). It covered only the sums collected by two of the three companies ($57,600 and $116,785), and only for victims who were still in Singapore at the time of sentencing, or who were abroad but able to arrange to receive the money. The limit was not a reduction in the offender’s favour: the court explained that it reflected the practical difficulty of returning money to victims who had gone back to their home countries or could no longer be contacted.

A compensation order differs from a penalty. A compensation order is paid to the victims, to make good the loss caused by the offence, and should not exceed what they could reasonably obtain in civil proceedings. A penalty is measured instead by the benefit the offender received, and is recoverable as a fine, so it is paid to the State rather than to the victims. A penalty does not affect the victims’ right to recover their losses from the offender (for example, section 7(4) of the MLM Act).